Bertina Rae Olseth v. Matthew D. Larson : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2005
Bertina Rae Olseth v. Matthew D. Larson : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Wesley Robinson; Senior City Attorney; Attorney for Defendant/Appellee Matthew D. Larson.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Olseth v. Larson, No. 20051180 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2005).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6213
Case No. 20051180 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
BERTINA RAE OLSETH, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MATTHEW D. LARSON, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
MATTHEW D. LARSON 
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION OF UTAH STATE LAW FROM THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
On Appeal From An Order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Civil No. 2:02-CV-l 122PGC 
HONORABLE PAUL G. CASSELL 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON, #6321 
Senior City Attorney 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)535-7788 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Matthew D. Larson 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY 
FILED 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE MATTHEW D. L A R S J ^ ^ p ^ E
 C 0 U R T S 
MAY 3 0 2006 
Case No. 20051180 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF UTAH 
BERTINA RAE OLSETH, ; 
Plaintiff and Appellant, ] 
vs. ] 
MATTHEW D. LARSON, ] 
Defendant and Appellee. ] 
) BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
) MATTHEW D. LARSON 
ON CERTIFIED QUESTION OF UTAH STATE LAW FROM THE 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT 
On Appeal From An Order of the United States District Court for the 
District of Utah, Civil No. 2:02-CV-l 122PGC 
HONORABLE PAUL G. CASSELL 
J. WESLEY ROBINSON, #6321 
Senior City Attorney 
451 South State, Suite 505 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Telephone: (801)535-7788 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellee 
Matthew D. Larson 
NO ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED BY 
DEFENDANT/APPELLEE MATTHEW D. LARSON 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 1 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 1 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 3 
ARGUMENT 6 
I. NO TOLLING APPLIES 6 
A. Olseth's Brief Largely Fails To Address the 
Relevant Issues 6 
B. Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 did not toll the four-year 
statute of limitations 7 
CONCLUSION 17 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (CD. UT 1997) 14 
Arrowood v. McMinn County, 121 S.W.2d 566 (1938) 14 
Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) 13 
Doe v. Anderson, 524 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 1994) 13 
Dupree v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, 63 S.W.3d 220, 222 
(Missouri 2002) 14 
Hansen v. Larsen, 797 A.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. Md. 2002) 13 
International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945).. 8 
Keith-O'Brien Co. v. Snyder, 169 P. 954 (1917) 10,11,12 
Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261, 1263 (N.M. 1973) 6,14 
Ko v. Elier Inds., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 641, 648 (111. App. 1997) 13 
Lipe v. Javelin Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1975) 13 
Lund v. Hall, 938 P.2d 285 (1997) 4,6,12,13,14 
Meyer v. Paschal, 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (S.C. 1998) 14 
Pennoyerv.Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) 8 
Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609, 611 (Ariz. 1974) 13 
Shin v. McLaughlin, 967 P.2d 1059, 1064 (Hawaii 1998) 13 
Snyder v. Clune, 390 P.2d 915 (1964) 11,15 
ii 
State v. McGarry, 151 A.D.2d 819 (S. Ct. N.Y. App. Div. 1989) 14 
Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 963 P.2d 1168, 1173 (Idaho 1998) 13 
Summerrise v. Summerrise, 454 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1969) 14 
Tracy v. Blood, 78 Utah 385, 3 P.2d 263, 266 (Utah 1931) 6 
Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 11,15 
Venables v. Bell, 941 F. Supp. 26, 27 (D. Conn. 1996) 13 
STATUTES 
42 United States Code § 1983 1,2 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-12-35 1,3,4,5,7,12,14,17 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-24 1,4,5,9,15 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-27-22 9,15 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-25 9,10 
RULES 
Fed. R. Civ. P. 4 16 
Utah R. Civ. P. 4 9 
PRIOR AND RELATED APPEALS 
To the best of Appellee Matthew D. Larson's knowledge, there are no 
prior or related appeals in this case. 
m 
ISSUES ON APPEAL 
1. Does Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 toll the applicable statute of 
limitations where the person against whom the claim has accrued was at all 
times amenable to service of process through Utah's long-arm statute, Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-24? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND UNDISPUTED FACTS 
Olseth filed her first action in this matter on May 15, 2000 against Salt 
Lake City Corporation (uthe City"), Salt Lake City Police Department and 
various police officers of Salt Lake City in their official capacities (Case No. 
2:00-CV-0402C), including Larson. That action alleged civil rights 
violations resulting from Olseth's arrest and injuries sustained when she was 
shot while commandeering a police vehicle on May 15, 1998. The only 
cause of action pled in her complaint, relevant to this action, was for an 
alleged 42 U.S.C. § 1983 violation based on her allegation of unlawful use 
of deadly force "against all Defendants in their official capacity." 
Olseth's first complaint was dismissed by Judge Tena Campbell on 
May 15, 2002 for failure to prosecute. Olseth filed her second complaint on 
October 11, 2002 against essentially the same parties, but named Larson for 
the first time in his individual capacity. The City moved for dismissal of all 
causes of action and parties. On June 6, 2003, the court granted in part the 
1 
City's motion, allowing only the "loss of limb or member" cause of action to 
remain against the City and Larson. Memorandum Order and Opinion, 
Federal Doc. #17. 
On May 2, 2003, Olseth filed an Amended Motion for Alternate 
Means of Service and Second Motion for Enlargement of Time (Doc. # 14). 
Because Larson was an out-of-state resident, and she was unable to locate 
him, her Motion requested alternate service of process by publication or 
mail, and an enlargement of time to effect service. This Motion was granted 
on June 6, 2003. Order of Alternate Service Upon Defendant Larson, Doc. 
#18. 
Upon the stipulation of the parties (stipulating only to the filing of the 
Amended Complaint, reserving all affirmative defenses and dispositive 
claims, if any), Olseth amended her complaint on September 17, 2003. 
Amended Complaint, Doc. #22. Olseth's Amended Complaint named 
Larson as the sole Defendant in his individual capacity, and asserted a cause 
of action against him under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for alleged violations of her 
14th, 9th and 10th Amendment rights. 
Larson moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Court lacked 
personal jurisdiction over him since he was never sued as an individual until 
Olseth filed her second complaint on October 11, 2002, more than four years 
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after the incident complained of. Because Larson was sued for the first time 
in his individual capacity beyond the statute of limitations period, the 
District Court granted Larson summary judgment. The Court gave Olseth 
10 days to research the issue further and petition the Court for 
reconsideration. The Court further told counsel for Larson that no response 
to a motion to reconsider would be required, unless notified otherwise by the 
Court. 
Olseth timely filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment (Doc. #42), 
but failed to address the controlling authority of the case. The Court denied 
Olseth's motion. Order Denying Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment, Doc. 
#44. Olseth appealed the Court's ruling to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit ("Tenth Circuit"). 
On December 16, 2005, the Tenth Circuit issued its Certification of 
Question of State Law, ruling in Larson's favor on one issue, and certifying 
the current issue to the Utah Supreme Court. The Utah Supreme Court 
issued its Order of Acceptance on February 6, 2006. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The Federal District Court properly granted summary judgment in 
favor of Larson, holding that Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 does not toll the 
applicable statute of limitations where the person against whom the claim 
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has accrued was at all times amenable to service of process through Utah's 
long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24. 
Olseth's cause of action accrued on May 15, 1998 when she was shot 
by Officer Larson while she attempted to commandeer a police vehicle. 
Olseth never sued Larson as an individual until October 11, 2002, four years 
and five months after her cause of action accrued. It is undisputed that the 
applicable statute of limitations in this case is four years. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 did not toll the four year statute of 
limitations in this matter. This Court held in Lund v. Hall that limitations 
periods are not tolled when a defendant is out of state so long as he is still 
amenable to service of process in Utah. This is the majority position of most 
states, and satisfies the purposes of limitation periods: encourage promptness 
in prosecution of actions, and avoid the injustice resulting from stale claims, 
lost evidence, faded memories and disappearing witnesses. 
By virtue of Utah's long arm statute, Larson was at all times subject to 
service of process whether physically in the state or out. By citing with 
approval two cases holding that limitations periods are not tolled where the 
defendant was amenable to service of process by virtue of those states' long 
arm statutes, Lund has, by implication, approved of the principle that long 
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arm statutes are acceptable substituted process for the purposes of tolling 
questions. 
Olseth could have applied to the district court at any time for 
substituted service of process on Larson. Indeed, she successfully petitioned 
the district court on May 2, 2003, and received leave of court to serve 
Larson by publication, albeit much too late. Olseth has failed to show why 
she could not timely serve Larson under Utah's long arm statute, and he 
should not be prejudiced by her dilatory attempts, or lack thereof, to afford 
him adequate due process. 
Because Larson was amenable to service of process by virtue of 
Utah's long-arm statute, no tolling applies. This is the judicial trend in Utah, 
and the majority position nationally. Thus, this Court should hold that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-35 does not toll the applicable statute of limitations 
where the person against whom the claim has accrued was at all times 
amenable to service of process through Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code 




NO TOLLING APPLIES 
A. 
OLSETH'S BRIEF LARGELY FAILS TO 
ADDRESS THE RELEVANT ISSUES 
At the outset, Larson informs the Court that he does not intend to 
address the outrageous, ridiculous, and unsupported allegations made by 
Olseth regarding the shooting, alleged perjury, and concealment of evidence 
on pages 12 and 13 of her brief. Those allegations serve no purpose other 
than to prejudice the Court against Larson, they are irrelevant to the issues at 
hand, and Larson requests that they be stricken and/or ignored by the Court. 
Further, Larson will not respond to the arguments in Olseth's brief 
that do not relate to the issue of law certified to this Court by the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Specifically, all issues 
identified by Olseth in her Summary of the Arguments on page 6 of her brief 
are irrelevant to the certified question of law, and are largely not addressed 
in her Argument . In addition, arguments related to choice of appropriate 
1
 Olseth argues that Larson failed to prove that he was "ever amenable to service." Not only is this 
argument irrelevant, it is Olseth's burden to prove entitlement to tolling of the statute of limitations in this 
case. See Tracy v. Blood, 78 Utah 385, 3 P.2d 263, 266 (1931) ("Apparently, all courts are agreed, and in 
this case it is conceded that the burden was upon the plaintiff to plead and prove facts sufficient to toll the 
statute of limitations."); Kennedy v. Lynch, 513, P.2d 1261, 1263 (N.M. 1973) (Therefore, when the 
plaintiff relies upon exceptions to prevent the running of the statutory period, he must prove that he is 
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statute of limitation in Point I (pp. 7-9), and evidence of Larson's 
amenability to service in Point II (16-17) are similarly irrelevant, and will 
not be addressed. 
B. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 did not toll 
the four-year statute of limitations. 
Olseth and Larson agree that the applicable statute of limitations in 
this case is four years. They disagree, however, as to how the limitation 
period should be computed. Olseth attempts to persuade this Court that 
Larson's absence from the State of Utah tolled the four-year statute of 
limitations during the time period he was out of state. Her argument 
disregards the purpose of Utah's tolling statute, relies on overruled case law, 
and ignores state and federal case law to the contrary. Furthermore, she 
conveniently fails to disclose the fact that she requested and was granted 
leave by the district court to serve Larson by publication. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 [hereinafter referred to as "Utah's tolling 
statute"] does not differ materially from its original enactment in Laws of 
Utah (1872), chapter IV, section 23. At that time, a person's ability to 
entitled to the benefit of all these exceptions."); 54 C.J.S. Limitations of Actions, § 365 ("In order to show 
that a cause of action apparently barred by limitations or prescription is not barred because of extraneous 
facts, it is necessary to prove all the facts put in issue that are necessary to take the case out of the operation 
of the statute."). The record is devoid of any facts supporting Olseth's contention that Larson was not 
amenable to service of process at all times. Therefore, her argument fails. 
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obtain personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state resident was severely 
limited by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution. Given this restraint, the tolling statute served the 
important purpose of preventing the statute of limitations from expiring on 
valid claims when the defendant was out of state and personal jurisdiction 
was not possible. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877) (holding in 
personam jurisdiction could only be obtained if the defendant is personally 
served within the state's territory or the defendant voluntarily appears). 
In the early 1900's, the jurisdictional reach of the states' courts began 
to expand, and by 1945, the United States Supreme Court adopted a more 
flexible standard for the assertion of personal jurisdiction. International 
Shoe Co. v. State of Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). This new standard 
only required that the defendant have certain minimum contacts with the 
forum state such that the maintenance of the suit did not offend "traditional 
notions of fair play and substantial justice." Id. at 316. As a result of 
International Shoe and its progeny, states began enacting long-arm statutes, 
which were comprehensive jurisdictional statutes based upon the 
defendant's conduct in the forum state. These long-arm statutes greatly 
expanded the jurisdictional reach of the states' courts, allowing a court to 
exert personal jurisdiction to the outer limits of the due process clause. 
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Utah's long-arm statute, Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24, was enacted in 
1969. It allowed Utah's courts to exert personal jurisdiction over any 
person, whether or not they are residents of Utah, if that person committed 
any of the acts enumerated in the statute. Its provisions are to be applied "so 
as to assert jurisdiction over nonresident defendants to the fullest extent 
permitted by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the 
United States Constitution." Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-25 allows service of process upon any party outside the state 
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Utah's tolling statute must be interpreted in light of its history, 
purpose, and in context with other statutes. When the purpose of the statute 
conflicts with its literal meaning, the purpose of the statute must be given 
effect. The tolling statute's purpose is to prevent the expiration of valid 
claims by virtue of the running of the statute of limitations where personal 
jurisdiction over a defendant cannot be obtained because the defendant is no 
longer within the state. Thus, in light of this purpose, the language in the 
tolling statute referring to a defendant who is "out of the state" describes a 
defendant who is beyond the personal jurisdiction and process of the court 
and not merely a defendant who is physically absent from the state. 
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Further, the purpose of the tolling statute should be harmonized with 
the purposes of the long-arm statute, the substitute service of process 
provisions of Rule 4 U.R.C.P and the statute of limitations, which are to 
allow parties to expeditiously adjudicate their claims. The purpose of the 
tolling statute is served where the long-arm statute or substitute service 
statute brings the defendant within the personal jurisdiction of the court. 
Under these circumstances, the tolling statute no longer applies because the 
need to delay the running of the statute of limitations ceases to exist. Under 
this construction, the purposes of all the provisions are served. 
To construe Utah's tolling statute in the manner urged by Olseth 
would allow lawsuits to be tolled indefinitely, for no good purpose, and to be 
brought in many cases at the virtually unlimited pleasure of the plaintiff. 
Defendants would not know with any certainty when they were safe from 
the threat of litigation. Plaintiffs could defer initiation of a suit until 
witnesses and evidence become unavailable and effectively deprive the 
defendant of their defense. Our legislature cannot have intended such an 
absurd and illogical result. 
Against this background, Olseth's reliance on Keith-O'Brien Co. v. 
Snyder, 169 P. 954 (1917), is misplaced. In Keith-O'Brien, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that even though the defendant's wife continued to 
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reside in the state during the defendant's seven-year absence, the statute of 
limitations ran only during the time periods defendant was in state. At the 
time, most jurisdictions with similar statutes permitted such tolling of the 
limitation period. 
This view has slowly eroded, beginning with Snyder v. Clune, 390 
P.2d 915 (1964). The Snyder Court held that a non-resident motorist's 
absence from the state did not toll the statute of limitations where substituted 
service was provided for by statute (the Nonresident Motorist Act). The 
Utah Court of Appeals revisited the same issue twenty-three years later in 
Van Tassell v. Shaffer, 742 P.2d 111 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). By this time, 
seventy years after the Keith-O'Brien decision, the majority of states did not 
apply comparable tolling provisions where a defendant was out of state but 
still amenable to process. The Van Tassell court reluctantly followed the 
Supreme Court's precedent from Keith-O'Brien, stating: 
We must also assume that proceedings under the nonresident motorist 
act are the only Utah proceedings in which the applicable statute of 
limitations is not tolled by absence from the state until and unless the 
Utah Supreme Court states otherwise. We observe, however, that 
the majority view, which holds that defendant's absence does not 
toll the statute of limitations where defendant is amendable to 
personal jurisdiction, would be preferred by this Court as the 
Utah rule, as we find it to be more consistent with the purposes of 
statutes of limitations. 
Van Tassell, 742 P.2d at 113 (footnote omitted, emphasis added). 
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In 1997, the Utah Supreme Court agreed, finally overruling the Keith-
O'Brien precedent in Lund v. Hall 938 P.2d 285 (1997). The Court held 
"[w]e agree with the court of appeals' opinion in Van Tassell regarding the 
preferred interpretation of the tolling provision and hold that under section 
78-12-35 the statute of limitations will not be tolled when a defendant is out 
of state, so long as he is still amenable to service of process in the state of 
Utah." Id. at 290. 
The Court noted that its holding was consistent with the 
majority of states' treatment of the issue, and recognized the valid purpose 
of statutes of limitations: to encourage promptness in prosecution of actions, 
and avoid the injustice resulting from stale claims, lost evidence, faded 
memories and disappearing witnesses. Id. at 291. With the modern concept 
of substituted service, it was no longer necessary to toll the limitations 
period when a defendant was otherwise amenable to service of process at all 
times, whether he was physically in state or not. The Court reasoned that 
"tolling the statute of limitations regardless of whether defendant remained 
amenable to service of process could lead to claims being filed many years 
after the cause of action arose and would be contrary to the rationale behind 
statutes of limitations." Id. 
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Olseth argues that Lund should be limited only to motor vehicle 
accidents involving nonresident motorists, but she argues for a distinction 
without importance. While it is true that the Court has not had occasion to 
pass on the effect given to the tolling statute in a context other than an 
automobile accident involving the nonresident motorist act, the Lund Court 
did not limit its holding to such cases. The Court expressly stated that where 
substituted service is available, the limitations period will not be tolled. 
It should be noted that the Lund Court cited with approval two cases 
that held the statute of limitations was not tolled where defendant was 
amenable to service of process by virtue of the state's long arm statute. See 
Bray v. Bayles, 618 P.2d 807, 810 (Kan. Ct. App. 1980) and Lipe v. Javelin 
Tire Co., 536 P.2d 291, 294 (Idaho 1975). The majority of other states have 
adopted a similar view . 
2
 See, e.g., Selby v. Karman, 521 P.2d 609, 611 (Ariz. 1974) (u[w]e, therefore, hold that the terms 'without 
the state' and 'absence' as used in A.R.S. § 12-501 mean out of the state in the sense that service of process 
in any of the methods authorized by rule or statute cannot be made upon the defendant to secure personal 
jurisdiction by the trial court."); Venables v. Bell, 941 F. Supp. 26, 27 (D. Conn. 1996) ("[Connecticut 
State Code] section 52-590 does not toll the running of a limitations period just because a defendant cannot 
be found. Rather, the statute preserves a right of action only if the defendant's absence from the state 
makes it impossible to obtain personal jurisdiction over him in Connecticut."); Shin v. McLaughlin, 967 
P.2d 1059, 1064 (Hawaii 1998) ([w]e hold that the statute of limitations is not tolled when a defendant is 
'out of state,' as long as he is still amenable to service of process in the state. This interpretation is also 
consistent with courts in other jurisdictions construing similar statutes"); Stonecipher v. Stonecipher, 963 
P.2d 1168, 1173 (Idaho 1998) (construing nearly identical tolling provision, "[wjhere jurisdiction over a 
defendant may be had under the 'long arm statute,' the defendant is not absent from the state within the 
meaning of [Idaho tolling provision]."); Ko v. Elier Inds., Inc., 678 N.E.2d 641, 648 (111. App. 1997) (no 
tolling where defendant subject to service of process outside of Illinois pursuant to long-arm statute); 
Hansen v. Larsen, 797 A.2d 118, 122 (Ct. App. Md. 2002) ("a person is not 'absent from the State' merely 
because he or she does not reside in Maryland . . . if jurisdiction over a defendant may be had under the 
long arm statute, the defendant is not absent from the state within the meaning of the statute that tolls the 
running of a statute of limitations."); Doe v. Anderson, 524 N.W.2d 336, 341 (Neb. 1994) ("the tolling 
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Interestingly, less than three months prior to the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Lund, Utah's federal district court was faced with 
predicting how the Utah Supreme Court would rule in a factually similar 
case. In Ankers v. Rodman, 995 F. Supp. 1329 (CD. UT 1997), U.S. 
District Court Judge David Sam considered Plaintiff Ankers' battery 
complaint against pro basketball player Dennis Rodman. Ankers filed suit 
against Rodman beyond the one-year limitation period for battery. Rodman 
moved for dismissal, and Ankers argued (as did Lund and Olseth) that Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-12-35 tolled the limitations period while Rodman was 
absent from the state. 
Rodman argued that he was subject to service of process under Utah's 
long arm statute for the entire time since Ankers' cause of action arose. 
Because no Utah appellate court had considered whether Section 78-12-35 
applied to nonresident defendants who are subject to service under the long 
arm statute, Judge Sam was required to anticipate how Utah's Supreme 
Court would rule. After a thorough review and analysis of Utah precedent, 
statute does not suspend the statute of limitations when one is absent from the state but nonetheless remains 
amenable to the service of personal process."); Dupree v. Zenith Goldline Pharmaceuticals, 63 S.W.3d 220, 
222 (Missouri 2002) (no tolling where service upon defendant can be had pursuant to long-arm statute); 
Kennedy v. Lynch, 513 P.2d 1261 (N.M. 1973); State v. McGarrv, 151 A.D.2d 819 (S. Ct. N.Y. App. Div. 
1989); Meyer v. Paschal 498 S.E.2d 635, 639 (S.C. 1998) ("we find the tolling statute is inapplicable when 
the nonresident defendant is amenable to personal service of process and the defendant can be brought 
within the personal jurisdiction of our courts."); Arrowood v. McMinn County, 121 S. W.2d 566 (1938) (no 
tolling unless defendant's absence from state is such as to prevent service of process); Summerrise v. 
Summerrise, 454 P.2d 224 (Wash. 1969) (defendant's absence from state did not toll limitation period 
because plaintiff could have secured personal jurisdiction over defendant under long-arm statute). 
14 
including Snyder and Van Tassell, Judge Sam correctly concluded that cases 
involving the nonresident motorist act are not the only ones where the Utah 
Supreme Court would decide not to toll the limitation period due to absence 
from the state where the defendant is subject to the reach of Utah's long arm 
statute. 
There, as here, a defendant cannot deprive a plaintiff of the 
opportunity of suing him by absenting himself from the state during the 
period of limitation. Because the long arm statute subjects the defendant to 
the jurisdiction of the state, the defendant's absence does not deprive the 
plaintiff of such an opportunity. 
Utah's express purpose in providing for jurisdiction over nonresidents 
is to "provide its citizens with an effective means of redress against 
nonresident persons, who, through certain significant minimal contacts with 
this state, incur obligations to citizens entitled to the state's protection." 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-22. Utah's long-arm statute provides that: 
Jurisdiction over nonresidents—Acts submitting person to 
jurisdiction. Any person . . . whether or not a citizen of resident of 
this state, who in person or through an agent does any of the following 
enumerated acts, submits himself. . . to the jurisdiction of the courts 
of this state as to any claim arising our of or related to: 
. . .(3) the causing of any injury within this state whether 
tortious or by breach of warranty . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-24 (3). 
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In this case, the record contains no valid explanation for Olseth's 
delay of more than four years from the date that Larson allegedly injured 
her. It is nonsensical to suppose that, where Larson was at all times subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of Utah courts and was within reach of the 
court's process, Olseth could refrain from taking action against Larson until 
after the limitations period expired simply because Larson resides in another 
state. Larson submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the state of Utah under 
the long arm statute by virtue of his alleged role in causing injury to Olseth 
in Salt Lake City on May 15, 1998. Whether physically in state or out, he 
was at all times amenable to service of process in the state of Utah. Olseth 
could have applied to the court at any time for substituted service by 
publication pursuant to Rule 4 of the Utah or Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure and Utah's long-arm statute. Indeed, she did just that on May 2, 
2003, and received leave of court to serve Larson by publication, albeit 
much too late. Olseth has utterly failed to show any reason why Larson 
could not be served within the four-year limitation period, and he should not 




Contrary to Olseth's assertion, Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-35 did not 
toll the four-year statute of limitations. Pursuant to Utah's long-arm statute 
and substituted service of process provisions, Larson was at all times subject 
to the personal jurisdiction of Utah's courts, and Olseth's failure to timely 
avail herself of these provisions is fatal to her claims. This Court should 
conclude that Utah's tolling statute is inapplicable where a nonresident 
defendant is amenable to service of process and the defendant can be 
brought with the jurisdiction of Utah's courts. 
Therefore, Defendant/Appellee Matthew D. Larson respectfully 
requests that this Court AFFIRM the District Court's decision to grant 
summary judgment in Larson's favor. 
Dated this 5 C 7 ^ day of May, 2006. 
j . WESLEY ROBINSON 
Senior Salt Lake City Attorney 
Attorney for Appellee 
Matthew D. Larson 
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